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GENDER VIOLENCE AS TORTURE:
THE CONTRIBUTION OF CAT
GENERAL COMMENT NO. 2
Rhonda Copelon*
Violence against women persists in every country in the world as a perva-
sive violation of human rights and a major impediment to achieving
gender equality. Such violence is unacceptable, whether perpetrated by the
State and its agents or by family members or strangers, in the public or
private sphere, in peacetime or in times of conflict. The Secretary-General
has stated that as long as violence against women continues, we cannot
claim to be making real progress towards equality, development and
peace.1
INTRODUCTION
By crystallizing the content of and giving teeth to the norm
prohibiting torture, the United Nations Committee Against Tor-
* Rhonda Copelon is a professor of law and director of the International Wo-
men’s Human Rights Law Clinic (IWHR) at the City University of New York School of
Law.  Professor Copelon spent twelve years at the Center for Constitutional Rights
(CCR) in New York City, where she remains a board member and volunteer attorney.
At CCR, she litigated civil rights cases with a focus on women’s rights and interna-
tional human rights cases including the landmark Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876
(2d Cir. 1980), that opened federal courts to international human rights claims. Pro-
fessor Copelon was a co-founder and directed the Legal Secretariat of the Women’s
Caucus for Gender Justice in the International Criminal Court and is a legal advisor
to the Coalition on Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations and other groups.
She has successfully advocated recognition of gender violence as torture in numerous
international and regional contexts working with IWHR interns and partners, includ-
ing on research and drafting proposals for this General Comment.  IWHR interns
who contributed to our work on the General Comment include  Monika Kirenga,
Christina Martin, Cynthia Pierce and Lara Rabiee.  I am also most grateful for the
contributions of Felice Gaer, Patricia Sellers, Lorena Fries, Judith Lewis Herman,
Ximena Bunster and Sir Nigel Rodley to my thinking about this subject; for the re-
search assistance of Lindsey Jennifer Blank and Bradley Parker on this Article as well
as the eleventh hour rescue by Lisa Davis, former editor-in-chief and organizer of this
Symposium; and, for assistance in the preparation of this Article, the current Law
Review board. I also want to acknowledge the contributions of the CUNY faculty semi-
nar that discussed a draft of this Article and the Professional Staff Congress (PSC)
CUNY Research Foundation which supported research for my original work on do-
mestic violence and torture between l992-93, infra note 14, and additional research on
this Article.
1 Report of the U.N. Secretary-General, In-Depth Study on All Forms of Violence
Against Women, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/61/122/Add.1 (July, 6 2006), available at http://
www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/v-sg-study.htm [hereinafter Sec’y Gen, In-depth
Study].
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ture’s (“CAT Committee” or “Committee”) General Comment No.
22 (“General Comment” or “Comment”) is a tremendous step for-
ward. First, as the panelists who have preceded me have discussed,
the General Comment closes the holes bored by counter-terrorism
policies—especially those approved and used by the Bush adminis-
tration—into the absolute and non-derogable prohibition on tor-
ture.3  Second, it makes clear the applicability of the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment (“Torture Convention,” “CAT Convention” or
“Convention”)4 to non-official or private conduct, whether by insti-
tutions or individuals, where the State acquiesces or fails to exer-
cise due diligence.5  And third, it eliminates long-standing
discrimination in the norm against torture by clearly situating
within the framework of the Torture Convention gender violence
and abuse—both official and officially countenanced private vio-
lence—against women and gender transgressors including non-
conforming women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and
queer (“LGBTQ”) folk.6
It is particularly significant that, despite the crisis respecting
State-inflicted torture, the Committee gave commensurate atten-
tion to the often less noticed, but ubiquitous epidemic of private
violence against women.7 In November 2007, Mr. Andreas Mavro-
matis, then Chair of the CAT Committee, opened the final public
discussion of the General Comment No. 2 by identifying domestic
violence as one of most crucial issues for the Committee to address
especially given the epidemic nature of such violence.8 In 2000,
2 U.N. Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, Implementation of Arti-
cle 2 by States Parties, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5 (Jan. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Gen-
eral Comment No. 2].
3 Id.; see also Margaret Satterwaithe, De-Torturing the Logic: The Contribution of CAT
General Comment 2 to the Debate over Extraordinary Rendition, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 281
(2008).
4 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S.
85, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984) [hereinafter CAT Convention].
5 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 18.
6 Id. ¶¶ 18–24.
7 Id. ¶¶ 21–24.
8 U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 39th Sess., Summary Record of the First Part
(Public) of the 782nd Meeting, Nov. 5, 2007, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. Nov CAT/C/SR.782
(Feb. 22, 2008) (“Some of them [referring to States parties] made additional sugges-
tions, notably to include domestic violence among the acts covered by article 2. The
Committee had itself raised that point repeatedly in recent times, since that was one
of the worst forms of ill-treatment, if only because of the extent of the phenome-
non. . . .”). As the Summary Record is not a verbatim transcript, this rendition does
not comport precisely with the Chair’s statement as I recall it.
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after Ms. Felice Gaer,9 one of the pioneers of gender work in the
human rights system, joined as an expert, the Committee began
frequently to question States parties regarding various forms and
incidences of gender violence both in official custodial situations,
in institutional contexts beyond prisons, and in situations of non-
State violence, including rape, female genital mutilation, forced
sterilization and abortion, trafficking, and domestic violence.10 Ms.
Gaer also played a critical role as co-rapporteur on the General
Comment, by which time the Committee had two more female
members and at least one male member with expertise in issues of
gender violence.11
These developments are the result of the global women’s
human rights movement’s insistence on the recognition of vio-
lence against women as a human rights issue and the integration of
gender into the work of the human rights system.12 This in turn
9 Felice Gaer is the Director of the American Jewish Committee’s Jacob Blaustein
Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights; she also serves as the Vice Chair of
the Committee Against Torture. See Felice Gaer, Opening Remarks: General Comment
No. 2, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 187 (2008).
10 E.g., U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations of the Committee
Against Torture, Sweden, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SWE/CO/5 (2008) (noting “con-
cern about the persistence of violence against women and children, including domes-
tic violence and crimes committed against women and children in the name of
honour”); Czech Republic, ¶ 6 (n), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/32/2 (2004) (recom-
mending that the State party “[i]nvestigate claims of involuntary sterilizations, using
medical and personnel records, and urge the complainants, to the extent possible, to
assist in substantiating the allegations”); Colombia, ¶ 10 (e), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/
31/1 (2004) (recommending that the State party “[i]nvestigate, prosecute and punish
those responsible for rape and other forms of sexual violence, including rape and
sexual violence that occur in the framework of operations against illegal armed
groups”); Russian Federation, ¶ 6 (e), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/28/4 (2002) (noting
concern that “despite numerous allegations of violence against women in custody, no
formal complaint has been received [by the State party] on this issue”); Ukraine, ¶ 5
(m), U.N. Doc. A/57/44 (2002) (recommending that the State party “[t]ake effective
measures to prevent and punish trafficking of women and other forms of violence
against women”);  Greece, ¶ 88 (d), U.N. Doc. A/56/44 (2001) (affirming that
“[s]teps should be taken to prevent and punish trafficking of women and other forms
of violence against women”).
11 Ms. Nora Sveaas and Ms. Essadia Belmir began their terms in 2005.  Committee
Against Torture Membership, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/members.
htm (last visited, Mar. 27, 2009).  Mr. Claudio Grossman, who joined the Committee
in 2003, was the Rapporteur on Women Rights when he served as a member of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. See http://www.wcl.american.edu/
faculty/grossman/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
12 These demands were crystallized in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action and implemented through various initiatives in the human rights system.  Vi-
enna Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶¶ 38, 40, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23
(1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration].  For history of various initiatives regarding
violence against women, see Sec’y Gen, In-Depth Study, supra note 1, ¶¶ 24–54.  While
today gender integration has led to undermining rather than strengthening autono-
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created a climate that brought attention to these issues and led to
the election and appointment of feminist and gender-competent
personnel in the treaty bodies and among the special rapporteurs.
Recognition of various forms of gender violence as torture, and,
where less severe or lacking in impermissible purpose, as cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment (“ill-treatment”),
has been an important goal in the process of gender integration.
Other human rights authorities and international criminal courts
took up the issue of gender violence as torture before the CAT
Committee joined the process.  Thus, gender violence, including
domestic violence, was gradually integrated into the fabric of the
Committee’s work.13 The recognition and process created by Gen-
eral Comment No. 2 opens the possibility of consistent attention to
this issue.  The value of the process will depend upon both the
engagement of NGOs, who provide essential material for the Com-
mittee’s assessment of State compliance with the Convention, and
the continued openness and will of the Committee and the States
parties.
Understanding the potential of the General Comment to gen-
erate this dialogue is the focus of this short Article. I will start with
a brief discussion of the reasons why I believe gender violence es-
caped sanction for so long as well as the recent recognition of
gendered torture in international law.  The second part examines
the various provisions of the General Comment, both gender-spe-
cific and gender-neutral, that are pertinent to the definition of
gender violence and abuse as torture and its prevention.
While drawing on various forms of gender violence, the Article
gives particular attention to the applicability of the Committee’s
recognition that domestic violence—the most private and most
ubiquitous form of gendered cultural violence inflicted dispropor-
tionately but not exclusively on women—must be understood as
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
I was drawn to this question in 1991 in a workshop on gender vio-
lence at the Latin American and Caribbean Feminist Meeting (En-
cuentro Feminista).  Too familiar with torture as a result of their
experience under string of recently unraveling dictatorships, Latin
American feminists were insistent that what women experienced in
mous women’s entities and organizations, the notion that the human rights system
had to desist from excluding women from its protections through integrating gender
has caused a significant change in the personnel of and concerns addressed by the
human rights system. See Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Main-
streaming and Human Rights in the United Nations, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2005).
13 See, e.g., supra note 10.
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the home as domestic violence should be recognized as torture.  As
a result, I studied this question and was stunned by the largely un-
seen parallels between the official and domestic systems of violence
and subordination, the former being condemned while the latter
was largely tolerated by States throughout the world.  In l994, I
published Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence
As Torture,14 which argued for understanding domestic violence as
a system of physical and psychological control and for treating se-
vere domestic violence as torture.  That this understanding has
gained official recognition in General Comment No. 2 is thus par-
ticularly thrilling as I believe unveiling gender violence as torture is
critical to eliminating discrimination in the norm of torture; em-
phasizing the urgency of concerted and effective prevention
through legal, cultural and socio-economic change in the status of
women; and empowering the survivors of domestic violence by
shifting the blame that culture has imposed on women from victim
to perpetrator.
I. GENDER AND TORTURE
In l986 when Peter Kooojmans, the first Special Rapporteur
on Torture, listed rape as a form of official torture and noted that
State-tolerated traditional practices involving sexual mutilation
could be considered torture, it was a huge, and to some radical,
breakthrough.15  Although the founding human rights docu-
ments16 all condemned sex discrimination and the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(“CEDAW”)17 had entered into force in l981 (“CEDAW Conven-
14 Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence As Tor-
ture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 325–29 (1994) [hereinafter Copelon, Recogniz-
ing the Egregious].  An earlier version was published as Intimate Terror: Domestic Violence
As Torture, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
85 (Rebecca Cook ed., 1994). The original work, as well as this Article, were sup-
ported by grants from the Professional Staff Congress, City University of New York
(PSC CUNY) Research Foundation.
15 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ¶¶ 119, 138, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1986/15 (1986) (prepared by Peter Kooijmans).
16 U.N. Charter art. 55(c); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 2, G.A.
Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights [ICESCR] arts. 2(2) & 3, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. D, 95-2
(1978), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights [ICCPR], Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
17 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
[CEDAW], Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980).
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tion”), gender violence was invisible on the human rights agenda
and even the CEDAW Convention did not explicitly include it.18
The explanation is rooted in the patriarchal hierarchy that un-
derlies and perpetuates deeply rooted gender discrimination and
the subordination of women.  Male control over women and fe-
male submission are staples of patriarchy that take different forms
in different times and cultures.  Common to this diversity, violence
against women is extensive and the harm it entails is either justi-
fied, trivialized, or denied.  Further, to maintain this gender hierar-
chy, life is constructed into separate spheres: a “public” sphere
identified generally with male power, rationality, and entitlement
and a feminine  “private” or familial one, identified with female
chastity, emotionality, subservience, and obedience, though again
what is considered “public” or “private” varies considerably in dif-
ferent contexts.19 At the core of the construction of gender are
hierarchy and hetero-normativity.  The hierarchy favors males and
dis-empowers females, channeling them into less visible or less val-
ued roles, notwithstanding that in many cultures women are the
breadwinners and staple of the community.  At the same time, the
strict dualism of the gender hierarchy underpins heterosexuality as
the norm for sexuality and family, protecting hetero-normativity
through law, religion, and culture as against alternative forms of
intimate or personal relations that are outlawed or stigmatized as
threatening to the basic structure of life and even the security of
the nation.
Accordingly, when I speak of gender here, I am incorporating
the way that both female and male roles and the hetero-normative
dyad are constructed, preserved, and exclude gender “transgres-
sors” who reject the roles, relationships and identities that society
has ordained for them.  This includes women who break out of
ascribed roles for work, community, political involvement or sexual
relationships, as well as LGBTQ folks who reject hetero-normative
sexual and/or gender identities.  The effect of this gender scheme
on the visibility of and accountability for gender violence can be
devastating: it tends to insulate the sphere of intimate, or family
relations from State intervention even in the face of violence at the
same time as it presumes and publicly sanctions female and
LGBTQ disobedience.20
18 Id.
19 See HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 38-61 (2000).
20 See Michael O’Flaherty & John Fisher, Sexual Orientation, Gender, Identity and In-
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In such a scheme, violence against women is only rarely
treated as violence, let alone torture.  Rape and other gender vio-
lence have been viewed as justifiable.  Marital rape, for example,
had long been accepted in domestic law based on the legal pre-
sumption that women give irrevocable consent to sex when they
take the marriage vows.  Lesbian women or women suspected of
being lesbian may be raped in an effort to make them “real” wo-
men.21 Internationally, although the laws of war called for protec-
tion against rape and implicitly embraced it within its prohibitions,
rape was generally treated as the reward of soldiers, an inevitable,
collateral, even if not felicitous consequence of war, and was rarely
prosecuted until the mid-1990s.22 Domestic violence has often
been justified or excused by the batterer or society as a legitimate
response to women’s “failures,” while women have been condi-
tioned to accept it as such.23
Justification, trivialization and denial also play a significant
role.  Rape remains one of the most common but least prosecuted
or punished offenses in both domestic and international con-
texts.24  For the woman who has access to justice and the stamina to
charge rape, a myriad of discriminatory doubts as to the veracity of
her claim are raised by the accused as well as by officials.25  Sexual
ternational Human Rights Law: Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles, 8 HUM. RTS. L.
REV 207 (2008).
21 Id. at 209–10.
22 KELLY DAWN ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 217–22 (1997). See Patricia Viseur Sellers & Kaoru
Okuizumi, International Prosecution of Sexual Assaults, 7 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 45, 47 (1997); Patricia Viseur Sellers, Rape Under International Law, in WAR
CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG 159, 160–61 (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999).
23 See Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes Against Women in Hu-
manitarian Law, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J., 243–65 (1994) [hereinafter Copelon, Sur-
facing Gender].
24 MAJA KIRILOVA ERIKSSON, REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM: IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 478 (1999) (stating that “rape and
other grave violations of women’s reproductive rights under international humanita-
rian law committed all over the world have for centuries remained . . . the least prose-
cuted crimes”); ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Further Promotion and
Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the
Programme and Methods of Work of the Commission: Alternative Approaches and Ways and
Means Within the United Nations System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ¶ 263, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/42 (Nov. 22, 1994)
(prepared by Radhika Coomasrawamy) (describing rape as the “least condemned war
crime”); see Copelon, Surfacing Gender, supra note 23.
25 See Michelle Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corrobora-
tion Requirement, and the Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 945, 955–66 (2004); Kathy Mack, Continuing Barriers to Women’s Credibility: A Femi-
nist Perspective on the Proof Process, 4 CRIM. L.F. 327, 329 (1993); see also Carol Smart,
Feminism and the Power of Law, in LAW AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: CASES AND
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slavery of approximately 200,000 “comfort women” forced to serve
the Japanese military during the Second World War, was denomi-
nated prostitution, excusing perpetrators and stigmatizing and rel-
egating its victims to marginalized invisible lives.26  At the same
time, the law in most places draws a line between good and bad
women, criminalizing adultery and voluntary prostitution rather
than treating the former as sexual autonomy and latter as a form of
work.  Likewise, battered women may be denied access to justice
altogether, their calls for help ignored, or they may face police or
judges who admonish them to go home and “behave” even when
the danger or their physical wounds are apparent.  Anglo-Ameri-
can common law recognized the husband’s right to moderate chas-
tisement, sometimes referred to by courts and in the popular press
as an application of the “rule of thumb”—permitting a husband to
punish his wife with a rod no thicker than a thumb.27 Among the
most extreme forms of violence against women, stoning is still prac-
ticed, with legal or traditional sanction in some countries today.28
Opposition to recognizing rape as a grave human rights viola-
tion was illustrated in l994 when the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights was first asked by a coalition of women’s groups
and advocates in Haiti and the United States to declare that official
and tolerated unofficial rape under the illegal Cedras regime was
torture.  The discussion in the then all-male conference of experts
went like this:
One of the commissioners proposed that rape be recognized as
torture.  Another member objected in words to the effect: “You
put it in, you take it out. I don’t see what the big deal is.”  The first
then reminded the Commissioners that it couldn’t write rape
out of torture when it had consistently treated the picana (elec-
MATERIALS ON SYSTEMS OF OPPRESSION 440–41 (Beverly Balos & Marie Louise Fellows
eds., 1994).
26 See Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal For the Trial of Japan’s Mili-
tary Sexual Slavery, Final Judgment, Case No. PT-200-1-T (Dec. 4, 2001), available at
http://www1.jca.apc.org/vaww-net-japan/english/womenstribunal2000/Judgement.
pdf; IRIS CHANG, THE RAPE OF NANKING: THE FORGOTTEN HOLOCAUST OF WORLD WAR
II (1997).
27 The feminist claim that wife-beating provided the origin of the term “rule of
thumb” has been disproved, but there remains evidence that the expression was used
in legal cases and in the popular press in Britain and the United States beginning in
mid-18th century. See State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 454 (1868) (holding that “[t]he
Defendant had a right to whip his wife with a switch no bigger than his thumb”); State
v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 44, 45 (1874) (holding that “[t]he doctrine of years ago, that a
husband had the right to whip his wife, provided he used a switch no longer than his
thumb, no longer governs decisions of our courts”).
28 See, e.g., The Global Campaign to Stop Killing and Stoning Women!, http://
www.stop-stoning.org (last visited Nov. 19, 2008).
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tric prod) on the penis as torture.29
This settled the issue, at least formally as attitudes die hard, and the
Commission issued the first human rights treaty body decision
clearly treating rape as a form of torture.30  Paradoxically, by com-
parison to the difficulty of recognizing female rape as torture, elec-
tricity on the penis, which, though a form of rape under current
definitions, will likely continue to be exclusively referred to as
torture.31
Patriarchal ideology also constructed the private sphere of
family and intimate relations as off-limits to State intervention even
where violence was concerned.  Thus, although Anglo-American
courts rejected the “rule of thumb” as, for example, “a remnant of
feudal authority,” this did not, for over a hundred years, change
the result for a battered woman. Rather the courts substituted pri-
vacy for the rule of thumb, trusting in the husband’s moderation in
relation to “misbehavior” in order to protect him from “vexatious
prosecutions, resulting in the mutual discredit and shame of all
parties concerned.”  In other words, by adopting a hands-off policy,
the public sphere supported the violent exercise of power in the
so-called private sphere.32  But the impact of the public/private di-
chotomy was felt far beyond the home, insulating from accounta-
bility even official abuse of women in public institutions. For
example, rape of a female detainee by a prison guard has been
treated as beyond the scope of official duty.33  Casting the rape as a
29 Recounted to author by member of the Commission.
30 Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Conclusions and
Recommendations, OEA/Ser.L/v/II.88, doc. 10 rev., ¶¶ 131–34 (1995) [hereinafter Ha-
iti, Inter-Am. C.H.R.]. See also Raquel Martı́ de Mejı́a v. Perú, Case 10.970, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R., Report No. 5/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 157 (1996) [hereinafter
Martı́ de Mejı́a, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.] (finding that rape may constitute torture in some
circumstances); Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
160, ¶ 306 [hereinafter Castro-Castro, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.].
31 The International Criminal Court, Elements Annex, defines rape as a war crime
and as a crime against humanity where there is “penetration, however slight.”  Inter-
national Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1, 8(2)(e)vi-1 &
7(1)(g)–1, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000). The Akayesu Judgment simi-
larly defined rape as a “physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person
under circumstances which are coercive.” Prosecutor v. Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Crimes Against Humanity ¶ 598 (1998). Both definitions encompass the placing of an
electric prod on or a wire into the penis.
32 See, e.g., Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. 156 (1824), overruled in Harris v. State, 14 So.
266 (1894); Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating As Prerogative and Privacy,
105 YALE L. J. 2117 (1996).  For a valuable compendium on Domestic Violence, see
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, CHERYL HANNA, JUDITH G. GREENBERG & CLARE DALTON,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2008).
33 See Brenda V. Smith, Watching You, Watching Me, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 225,
235–36 (2003).
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personal act as opposed to an abuse of power also implied that it
was consensual or even that the prisoner instigated it.
The trivialization of gender violence and the public–private
divide seemed even more powerful when translated to interna-
tional law.  Before 1990, international human rights law focused
mainly on what qualified as extreme or gross harm that States do
directly and what became the global women’s human rights move-
ment was in formation.  Rape in prison was a possible candidate for
international scrutiny, but community or private violence in the
kitchen, bedroom or the streets was seen as a “domestic” matter,
belonging to the sovereignty of States and beyond the ken of inter-
national law.  In the early 1990s, as the global women’s human
rights movement was coalescing, some mainstream human rights
leaders feared that recognition of violence against women, beyond
direct State violence, would “dilute” human rights.  State-centric
thinking—that the power of the State to do harm trumps all other
power—thus, minimized (and still tends to minimize) the harm
that private actors can do, whether they be armed groups or violent
spouses.  Further, the view that State violence is worse than private
violence is rooted in the theory that where the violence is private,
the State will provide redress. The theory founders, however, where
the State does not have the will or effective mechanisms for inter-
vention and protection against private violence. In such situations,
the brutality of the private actor knows no limits.
Challenging State-centrism, scholars like Celina Romany, ar-
gued that the power that men exercise in the home –permitted by
State inaction—constructs a “parallel state” for women.34  Without
a pro-active State, the battered woman does not have access to jus-
tice. Additionally, her individual poverty or lack of resources, re-
sponsibility for children, the external and internalized culture of
female obedience, and the threat that attends any resistance, in-
cluding leaving, makes escape impossible—or at least seem impos-
sible.35 Feminist theory that the State has obligations to exercise
due diligence with respect to non-State violence was supported by
key developments in human rights law. The 1988 ground-breaking
decision of the Inter-American Court in the case of Velásquez Rodrı́-
quez recognized State responsibility for what it treated as private
34  See Celina Romany, State Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of the Pub-
lic/Private Distinction in International Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 85 (Rebecca Cook ed., 1995).
35 See, e.g., Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, a.k.a., Why Abuse Victims Stay, 28
COLORADO LAWYER 19 (1999); Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Rede-
fining Issues of Separation Assault, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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paramilitary violence where the State failed to exercise due dili-
gence to prevent, investigate and punish the perpetrators as well as
provide redress to victims.36  The ruling was based on a crucial
principle of international political and civil rights—that the State
has the responsibility not only to respect (do no active wrong) but
also positively to ensure protection of the rights protected by the
Conventions through the exercise of due diligence. Thus, contrary
to the negative approach of the U.S. Constitution,37 international
human rights demands that States take responsibility to protect the
basic civil and political rights of all those subject to its jurisdiction
against the acts of third parties.
While scholarship and precedent clearly contributed to the
sea-change in the international response to gender violence, the
consolidation of the global women’s human rights movement and
its revelation of the epidemic nature of private gender violence
forced recognition that the positive obligations central to political
and civil rights must apply with full force to the elimination of vio-
lence against women.  The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW Committee”) took the
lead in its General Recommendation No. 19, recognizing gender
violence as a form of discrimination against women, dispensing
with the need to compare the treatment of men and women, and
outlining States parties’ responsibility to prevent violence against
women.38  As a result of the work of the women’s human rights
caucus and the production of a ground-breaking women’s tribunal
on violence against women, the World Conference on Human
Rights in Vienna in l993 followed, representing a watershed in the
official process of re-conceptualizing human rights and violence
against women from a gender perspective.39  Thereafter, this was
36 Velásquez Rodrı́guez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 4, (1988) [hereinafter
Velásquez Rodrı́guez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.].
37 See generally DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S.
189 (1989) (finding no federal civil rights jurisdiction for failure of state to protect
battered child); see also Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748, 754 (2005)
(finding no federal civil rights jurisdiction where state fails to enforce judicial protec-
tive order).
38 CEDAW Comm., General Recommendation No. 19, Violence Against Women,
U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992) (noting that discrimination against women includes gen-
der-based violence—violence directed against a woman because she is a woman, or
violence that affects women disproportionately) [hereinafter CEDAW, General Rec-
ommendation 19].
39 In addition to the issues of gender-violence discussed herein, see Vienna Decla-
ration, supra note 12, art. 2, ¶ 18 (emphasizing the “full and equal enjoyment by
women of all human rights” and the importance of the full participation of women in
development and in all spheres of life); id. ¶ 19 (the elimination of covert as well as
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consolidated and advanced through such international develop-
ments as the General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women40 and the creation, by the U.N. Human
Rights Commission in l994, of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Vio-
lence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences,41 which has
produced a significant body of both thematic and country re-
ports.42  All this quickly laid the foundation for continuing atten-
tion to violence against women.
Still, resistance to recognizing gender violence as torture per-
sisted notwithstanding that the international definition of torture
surely encompassed it.  For example, the original Legal Advisors to
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia resisted charging rape as the war crime of torture.43
Was it a failure to envision the full gravity of the harm?  Or was/is
there something threatening to heterosexuality if non-voluntary
sexual intercourse—not an uncommon experience for women—
can carry the “special stigma” of torture?  Fortunately, with the gui-
dance of Patricia Viseur-Sellers as the gender legal advisor, who
discussed rape as torture in the first panel,44 the Chief Prosecutor,
Richard Goldstone, saw it differently and authorized her to bring
the cases that established rape as torture in time of war.45 In addi-
overt discrimination); id. ¶ 41 (the importance of “enjoyment by women of the high-
est standard of physical and mental health,” and access to family planning and educa-
tion). See, e.g., Center for Women’s Global Leadership, available at http://www.
cwgl.rutgers.edu/index.html (Dec. 15, 2008); CHARLOTTE BUNCH & NIAMH REILLY, DE-
MANDING ACCOUNTABILITY: THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN AND VIENNA TRIBUNAL FOR WOMEN’S
HUMAN RIGHTS 36 (1994); Donna J. Sullivan, Women’s Human Rights and the 1993 World
Conference on Human Rights 88 A.M. J. INT’L L. 152, 167 (1994).
40 G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/48/104 (1993)[hereinafter G.A.
Decl. Violence Against Women].
41 U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights [OHCHR], Question of Inte-
grating the Rights of Women into Human Rights Mechanisms of the United Nations and the
Elimination of Violence Against Women, U.N. Doc. E/CN/.4/RES/1994/45 (Mar. 4
1994).
42 The excellent reports of the U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Violence Against Wo-
men, Its Causes and Consequences, (Radhika Coomaraswamy and Yakin Ertürk) are
available at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
website.  http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/rapporteur/annual.htm
(last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
43 Conversation between author and legal advisors.
44 See Patricia Viseur-Sellers, Sexual Torture As a Crime Under International Criminal
and Humanitarian Law, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 339 (2008).
45 See Prosecutor v. Celibici, Case No. IT-96-21, (Nov. 16, 1998); Prosecutor v.
Furundzija, Case No. IT–95–17/1–T, Judgment, (Dec. 10, 1998) Prosecutor v.
Furundzija, Case No. IT–95–17/1–T, Appeal Chamber Judgment (July 21, 2000);
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, & Vukovic, Case No. IT–96–23&23/1–A, Trial Cham-
ber Judgment (Feb. 22, 2001); and most importantly, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, &
Vukovic, Case No. IT–96–23&23/1–A, Appeal Judgment (June 12, 2002).
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tion, the Inter-American and European human rights systems rec-
ognized official rape as torture.46  Kooijmans’s assertion that rape
in prison could be torture was affirmed by successive Special Rap-
porteurs on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment.47 The unanimity on the question of official
or war rape as torture has thus placed rape a fortiori in the category
of a non-derogable ius cogens norm.48
Gradually as well, the notion that privately inflicted gender vi-
olence could constitute torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment when the State has acquiesced gained
currency.  The Inter-American Commission’s Haiti report recog-
nized rape as torture when the State took no action against
paramilitaries and roving gangs (zenglendos).49 The Special Rap-
porteur on Violence Against Women was the first rapporteur to put
the issue of treating domestic violence as torture or ill-treatment
on the table.50 And the CAT Committee began to question and
46 Martı́ de Mejı́a, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., supra note 30; Aydı́n v. Turkey, 25 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 251 (1997); see also Haiti, Inter-Am. C.H.R., supra note 30, ¶ 133 (“The Commis-
sion considers that rape represents not only inhumane treatment that infringes upon
physical and moral integrity under Article 5 of the Convention, but also a form of
torture.”).
47 Quoting from Mr. Kooijmans’s 1992 report, Mr. Rodley stated that “since it was
clear that rape or other forms of sexual assault against women in detention were a
particularly ignominious violation of the inherent dignity and the right to physical
integrity of the human being, they accordingly constituted an act of torture.” U.N.
ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Sub-
jected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ¶ 18, 19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/34 (Jan.
12, 1995) (prepared by Nigel S. Rodley) (quoting U.N. ECOSOC Comm’n on Human
Rights, 48th Sess., Summary Record of the 21st Mtg., ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/
SR.21 (Feb. 21, 1992)).
48 While the recognition of rape as torture has been important to treating rape as
a ius cogens violation, it should be noted that the greater visibility of rape and sexual
violence generally has led to their direct acceptance as non-derogable crimes.  In par-
ticular, see arts. 7(1)(g) and 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute,
describing rape as also constituting a grave breach and serious violation of the Geneva
Conventions. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 37
I.L.M. 1002 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
49 See Inter-Am. C.H.R, Haiti, supra note 30, ¶¶131–34.
50 See U.N. ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Further Promotion and Encourage-
ment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme
and Methods of Work of the Commission: Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within
the United Nations System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and
Consequences. . .: A Framework for Model Legislation on Domestic Violence, ¶ 50, U.N. Doc.
E/CN 4/1996/53, (Feb. 2, 1996) (prepared by Radhika Coomaraswamy). Cf. U.N.
ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Sub-
jected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ¶¶ 15-24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/34 (Jan.
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comment to States about non-official rape and domestic violence.
The years 2007-2008 saw major progress. The CAT Commit-
tee’s General Comment placed the range of gender violence—
from public to private—squarely within the frame of the Torture
Convention.51 And, the Special Rapporteur on Torture devoted a
major section of his annual report to analyzing a broad range of
gender violence, including privately inflicted violence, as torture
and ill-treatment.52  Both address gender violence not only in rela-
tion to harmful non-Western cultural practices, but most impor-
12, 1995) (prepared by Nigel S. Rodley)(identifying a range of gender violence against
women detained by the State as torture).
51 See General Comment No. 2, supra note 2.
52 U.N. Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil,
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development: Report of
the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/3 (Jan. 15, 2008) (prepared by Manfred Nowak) [herein-
after Nowak, Strengthening the Protection of Women from Torture]. This Article will make
brief reference to the Nowak report in relation to issues addressed by the General
Comment and thus does not do justice to the totality of his study and the important
doors it opens. At the same time as it is an important contribution to the field, I want
to signal a major concern: his assertion that powerlessness should be added as an
additional, essential element of torture. Id. ¶¶ 28–29.  He offered this argument orig-
inally as an additional means of distinguishing ill-treatment from torture where the
person is not yet in State custody. See U.N. ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Civil
and Political Rights, Including the Questions of Torture and Detention: Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Question of Torture, ¶¶ 39-40, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/6 (Dec. 23,
2005) (prepared by Manfred Nowak).  In my view, this is problematic for any form of
violence as even a person in official detention may not be powerless.  Beyond that, it is
particularly problematic when applied to gender violence—and especially private
gender violence such as battering. Mr. Nowak explains that surrounding circum-
stances can be taken into account to determine a woman’s powerlessness (e.g., the
nature of the act, such as rape; the lack of access to justice or legal separation from
the violent relationship; or discriminatory laws). And he states that “[a]s applied to
situations of ‘private’ violence, . . . the degree of powerlessness of a victim must be
tested.  If it is found that the victim is unable to flee or otherwise coerced into staying
by certain circumstances, the powerlessness criterion can be considered fulfilled.” No-
wak, Strengthening the Protection of Women from Torture, ¶ 28. The problem with this
approach is that it calls for refocusing the torture assessment on the condition of the
victim of the violence rather than on the acts of the perpetrator. The discriminatory
question—“Why didn’t she leave?”—which blames the woman for her abuse is back
on the table. The powerlessness criterion also ignores that many women subjected to
private violence are not in fact powerless, but rather are making decisions—often to
acquiesce and survive or protect others—within the frame of very limited options and
the fear of accessing help, including justice.  Mr. Nowak’s formulation suggests that to
be tortured the battered woman must be reduced to a state of learned helplessness, a
theory, which, though applicable to some battered women, has been repudiated as
denying the agency that battered women so carefully and desperately exercise. See
Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious, supra note 14, at 341–50. While one can cite many
factors that enhance women’s vulnerability to intimate violence, it should be suffi-
cient evidence of control that the batterer succeeds in inflicting severe physical or
mental violence.
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tantly in relation to garden-variety rape, domestic violence, and
denial of reproductive rights which are the staples of patriarchal
cultural practices globally.  Additionally, while the Torture Rap-
porteur focused on violence against women, the CAT Committee
explicitly encompasses the risk of torture faced by other gender
transgressors.
Thus, incrementally, the challenge that Kooijmans set forth in
l986, and that was pursued by the global women’s human rights
movement, gained traction: first, in recognizing rape and other
sexual abuse in prison or war as torture in human rights and inter-
national criminal law; and then, in piercing the public–private dis-
tinction to identify State responsibility for torture by non-State
actors. The General Comment is particularly significant because it
consolidates this understanding as the considered and formal in-
terpretation of the Convention against Torture that will guide its
review of State reports.  It thus encourages non-governmental sub-
missions respecting gender violence, signals an end to the era of
discriminatory application of the norm of torture as well as under-
scores the urgency of State responsibility to exercise due diligence
to prevent, punish, and eliminate it.
II. THE GENERAL COMMENT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF GENDER
While other human rights treaty bodies have issued General
Comments dedicated to gender discrimination as well as inte-
grated gender concerns in other topics,53 the CAT Committee inte-
grated gender throughout General Comment No. 2.54  Gender
integration is intended to ensure that gender perspectives inform
all aspects of the problem being addressed.  While that can be ex-
tremely positive and avoid the marginalization of gender issues,
nonetheless, a focus on gender is also critical to the process of fully
understanding and addressing the issues that gender presents.55
By mainstreaming gender, the General Comment makes clear that
gender is a pervasive issue. At the same time, the full and detailed
treatment of the subject is not possible given the limitations of
space and generalization.  Accordingly, the General Comment
should be read with these limitations in mind and, it is hoped, that
53 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 28, Article 3: Equality of
Rights Between Men and Women, U.N. Doc. A/55/40 (2000); U.N. ECOSOC, Comm. on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 16, Article 3: The Equal
Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N.
Doc. E/2006/22 (2005).
54 See General Comment No. 2, supra note 2.
55 Vienna Declaration, supra note 12.
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the CAT Committee will also develop a General Comment exclu-
sively devoted to gender.
The goal of General Comment No. 2 is to enhance the States
parties’ process of preventing torture.  Effective prevention is ac-
complished to begin with through clarifying definitional issues as
to what constitutes torture under Article 1, and the relationship
between ill-treatment and torture.  After discussing the Commit-
tee’s view of the scope of gender in the first section, the defini-
tional implications will be discussed in the second section.  The
final section addresses the applicability of the General Comment’s
specific measures of prevention to gender violence.  As a general
principle, the General Comment emphasizes that the obligation to
take “effective” measures to prevent torture under Article 2 is not
exhausted by the specific measures provided in the Convention,56
and thus recognizes the evolving nature of the process of review,
revision, and the implementation of new measures.57
As a result, one can hope that the States will take the issues of
gender more seriously and that the reporting dialogue will produc-
tively advance both theory and practice. For the nonce, this Gen-
eral Comment provides a sound basis, explicitly and implicitly, for
the Committee, to provide more thorough-going attention to gen-
der at the same time as it provides interpretation that can assist the
application of the torture framework to gender violence in other
contexts.  In this process, the involvement of NGOs in preparing
Shadow Reports remains crucial.
A. The Scope of Gender
In the section entitled, “Protection of individuals and groups
made vulnerable by discrimination or marginalization,” the Com-
mittee states:
The Committee emphasizes that gender is a key factor. Being
female intersects with other identifying characteristics or status
of the person such as race, nationality, religion, sexual orienta-
tion, age, immigrant status, etc. to determine the ways that wo-
men and girls are subject to or at risk of torture or ill-treatment
and the consequences thereof. The contexts in which females
are at risk include deprivation of liberty, medical treatment, par-
ticularly involving reproductive decisions, and violence by pri-
vate actors in communities and homes. Men are also subject to
certain gendered violations of the Convention such as rape or
56 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 13.
57 Id. ¶¶ 4, 14.
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sexual violence and abuse. Both men and women and boys and
girls may be subject to violations of the Convention on the basis
of their actual or perceived non-conformity with socially deter-
mined gender roles.58
Based on its review of a number of gender issues in States reports,
including violence against gay men and transgender people,59 the
Committee makes clear that both men and women are subject to
gender discrimination, and that individuals may be targeted on the
basis of their actual or perceived transgression of socially approved
hetero-normative gender roles in their societies.60 The General
Comment thus understands gender to be a social construction of
roles as opposed to a term applicable only to women61 or limited to
the notion of a biological male-female dichotomy. That the Com-
mittee includes, within the meaning of “socially determined gen-
der roles,” targeting based on one’s actual or perceived sexual
orientation and transgender identity is made explicit by its inclu-
sion of these categories in its discussion of the scope of discrimina-
tion.62 At the same time, it does not purport to be a full
explanation of gender, leaving out, for example, issues of hierarchy
and power.63
Further, like the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination (“CERD Committee”),64 the CAT Committee recog-
58 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 22.
59 See, e.g., U.N. OHCHR, Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations of the
Committee Against Torture, Argentina, ¶¶ 34, 35 U.N. Doc. A/60/44 (2004); Venezuela,
¶ 80, U.N. Doc. A/58/44 (2002); Egypt, ¶ 41, 42, U.N. Doc. A/58/44 (2002); Brazil, ¶
119, U.N. Doc. A/56/44 (2001).
60 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 22.
61 Its definition thus encompasses but is not limited by the CEDAW Committee’s
view that gender violence, in the context of women, is “violence that is directed
against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately,”
CEDAW, General Recommendation 19, supra note 38, ¶ 6.  Since CEDAW’s frame-
work is the elimination of discrimination against women, it would engage issues of
sexual orientation and transgender identities when the individual suffers discrimina-
tion on account of being a woman. See, e.g., CEDAW Committee, Annual Report to the
General Assembly at Its Forty-Ninth Session, ¶ 270, U.N. Doc. A/49/38 (Apr. 12, 1994).
62 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 21. It could be argued that identifying
“gender” as a ground of discrimination alongside sexual orientation and transgender
identity in this paragraph could be read to limit gender to women.  By elaborating the
broader understanding of gender in the next paragraph, the Committee clarifies
doubt about the scope of the term gender.
63 Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human
Rights in the United Nations, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 14–15 2005.
64 See, e.g., U.N. OHCHR, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
General Recommendation No. 25, Gender Related Dimensions of Racial Discrimina-
tion, annex V, U.N. Doc. A/55/18, (Mar. 20, 2000); see also Kimberlee Crenshaw,
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence Against Women of Col-
our, 43 STANFORD L. REV. 1241 (1991).
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nizes that gender is not a free-floating aspect of identity, but one
that intersects and is intertwined with the status of the person or
other characteristics.65  Thus, gender is understood as producing
distinct forms of gender-based discrimination that varies with its
impact on minoritized groups.66 It also applies to people for whom
gender may be a reason for incarceration,67 including women in-
carcerated for adultery or as a result of charging rape, and sex
workers and others detained or punished for their non-conformity
to traditional gender roles.68  The recognition that these and other
marginalized groups are at a special risk of torture requires not
only prosecution and punishment of abusers, but also positive mea-
sures to prevent this abuse. Thus, this brief discussion of gender is
an important contribution to ensuring that the principle of non-
derogability applies to all gender transgressors, as well as women,
before the Committee and in other contexts.
B. Article 1 Considerations: The Definition of Torture As Applied to
Gender Violence
The General Comment insists that States parties should use, as
a minimum, the Convention’s definition of torture.69  Article 1(1)
defines torture as involving four elements: 1) the intentional inflic-
tion on a person; 2) of severe physical or mental pain or suffering;
3) for such purposes as interrogation, punishment or intimidation
or coercion or a third person, or “for any reason based on discrimi-
nation of any kind”; and 4) when perpetrated or instigated by or
with the consent or acquiescence of a State official or person acting
in official capacity.70  In lieu of the first three elements, Article 16
identifies cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
as conduct “which do[es] not amount to torture” and reiterates the
same State involvement requirement.71
This section will examine the definition as clarified and elabo-
rated by the General Comment with particular attention to the ap-
plicability of the norm against torture to gender violence.  In this
regard, I will draw particularly on the example of domestic vio-
lence because it represents both the most endemic form of vio-
lence experienced by women worldwide as a function of the
65 See General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 22.
66 See id.
67 Id. ¶ 21.
68 Id. ¶ 22.
69 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 9.
70 CAT Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(1).
71 CAT Convention, supra note 4, art. 16(1).
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culture of patriarchy and, in terms of its intensely intimate charac-
ter, reflects the full spectrum of torture and ill-treatment.
1. Intentional Infliction
The General Comment clarifies that the element of intent is
not subjective but rather objective.72 The intent required is gen-
eral: that the person voluntarily engaged in conduct that made se-
vere pain or suffering objectively foreseeable,73 thereby
distinguishing torture from accidents, disease, or consensual bene-
ficial medical treatment. The notion that the perpetrator must spe-
cifically intend to torture was proposed by the United States and
rejected in the drafting of the Convention.74 It was then adopted
by the U.S. Senate as a limiting interpretation for domestic pur-
poses.75 But the Convention is not limited in its application to
sadists.  Thus, it is irrelevant to the definition of torture that an
accused rapist defends on the ground that he did not intend to
rape, but only intended, for example, to obtain sexual gratifica-
tion, as was argued by one of the accused in Prosecutor v. Kunarac.76
Batterers frequently argue that they lost control and acted impul-
sively.  But this is neither a legally cognizable excuse, nor is it con-
sistent with the dynamics of battering where the batterer acts with
the purpose of exercising control, and often plans his attack or
exhibits reasonable impulse control in other contexts.77
2. Severe Pain or Suffering
The General Comment does not discuss the standard of severe
pain or suffering but it is relevant insofar as it treats the relation-
ship between ill-treatment and torture.  As the General Comment
explains, “by comparison to torture, ill-treatment may differ in the
severity of pain and suffering and does not require proof of imper-
72 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 9.
73 Compare, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 48, art. 30.
74 See J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER
CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 41, 46 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter BURGERS & DANELIUS] (providing a history of the travaux préparatoires by the
Special Rapporteurs of the Convention Against Torture).
75 For example, a United States understanding of its obligations under the Con-
vention states, “That with reference to article 1, the United States understands that, in
order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physi-
cal or mental pain. . . .”  CAT Convention, supra note 4 (Declarations and Under-
standings made upon ratification).
76 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, & Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A,
Judgment, ¶ 129–30, 344 (June 12, 2002).
77  See Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious, supra note 14.
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missible purposes.”78
The significance of the General Comment for gender violence
in this regard is two-fold.  First, it concretizes the applicability of
the Convention to gender violence by identifying a non-exclusive
list, including rape, domestic violence, female genital mutilation
and trafficking79 of forms of violence, both official and private, as
to which the State has the obligation of prevention.  It also identi-
fies as contexts wherein females are at particular risk of torture or
ill-treatment, including deprivation of liberty, medical treatment,
particularly involving reproductive decisions, and communal gen-
der violence.80
Second, the General Comment addresses the fact that the
“definitional threshold between ill-treatment and torture is often
not clear”81 and that the two tend to be inextricably intertwined.
The General Comment points to the fact that “conditions that give
rise to ill-treatment frequently facilitate torture” and therefore the
effective prevention of torture requires parallel measures to pre-
vent ill-treatment.82 This closes a loophole that has been used not
only with regard to counterterrorism but also to violence against
women.  Further, the Committee concludes that ill-treatment is
also non-derogable and that the prevention of ill-treatment is a
non-derogable measure.83
The Committee’s understanding of the relationship between
torture and ill-treatment is particularly apt with regard to the char-
acter and need to prevent domestic violence.  While the pain and
suffering inflicted by rape is accepted as per se meeting the severity
threshold of torture,84 domestic violence may be different.  It usu-
ally involves a cycle that begins with ill-treatment and involves esca-
lating mental and physical violence, interrupted by pleas for
forgiveness, followed then by rising tension and escalating physical
and/or mental violence, creating severe pain or suffering as, end-
ing not infrequently, in death.85  While domestic violence does not
78 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 10.
79 Id. ¶ 18.
80 Id. ¶ 22.
81 Id. ¶ 3.
82 Id.
83 Id.; see also Sir Nigel Rodley, Reflections on Committee Against Torture General Com-
ment No. 2, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 353 (2008).
84 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, & Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/
1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 149–51 (June 12, 2002).
85 See LENORE E. A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984); see also Le-
nore E. A. Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 321, 326 (1992).
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involve official custody or control, it does involve de facto custody or
control generally exercised in a situation of much greater privacy—
that is, out of the potentially restraining sight of others (apart per-
haps from children or others living in the family) and beyond the
reach of, at least, nominal rules and potential reporting.  Thus, the
Committee’s understanding of the fine line between ill-treatment
and torture and the ease with which one becomes the other is fre-
quently played out in the context of privatized gender violence.
Importantly, the General Comment makes clear that the full range
of preventive measures under the Convention cannot await the mo-
ment when the violence is so severe that it qualifies as torture.
3. Impermissible Purposes
Here again, the General Comment clarifies that the element
of purpose in the definition is not intended to require subjective
inquiry but rather consideration of the goals and consequences of
the violence objectively.86
It is also clear that the purposes stated in Article 1(1) do not
exhaust the category of impermissibility.  As torture and CIDT are
considered non-derogable, clearly the purposes identified in Arti-
cle 2(2) are off-limits: “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever,
whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instabil-
ity or any other public emergency.”87 The General Comment’s em-
phasis on the non-derogability of both torture and CIDT is
fundamental, as well as its reference to the ius cogens status of tor-
ture under customary international law.88  With respect to gender,
the General Comment adds to this list of impermissible claims “any
religious or traditional justification that would violate this absolute
prohibition.”89  This significantly clarifies the scope of non-dero-
gability as it addresses one of the most common justifications ap-
plied to gender violence and abuse.  Additionally, it makes
operational statements in previous documents that reject such
claims when asserted to justify violence against women.90
86 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 9.
87 CAT Convention, supra note 4, art. 22.
88 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 1.
89 Id. ¶ 5.
90 See, e.g., World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, June 14–25, 1993, Report
of the World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (Oct. 13, 1993)
(prepared by the Secretary-General); Vienna Declaration, supra note 12, ¶ 5; Fourth
World Conference on Women, Beijing, Sept. 4–15, 1995, Report of the Fourth World
Conference on Women, ¶ 124, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (Oct. 17, 1995); Declaration
on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
48/104 (Dec. 20, 1995); CEDAW, General Recommendation 19, supra note 38, ¶ 20.
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The General Comment makes another important point about
impermissible purpose: it emphasizes, indeed italicizes, the lan-
guage of the Convention that gets less attention than most—“any
reason based on discrimination of any kind.”91  Consistent with the
principle of non-derogability, the General Comment adopts a
broad, but not exclusive, list of persons subject to discrimination
based on permanent or temporary identities, both attributed and
real.92 As noted above, it names as grounds for discrimination,
“gender, sexual orientation, [and] transgender identity . . .”93 and
recognizes that gender discrimination is an intersectional matter.94
It provides that “the discriminatory use of mental or physical vio-
lence or abuse is an important factor in determining whether an
act constitutes torture,”95 This incorporates hate crimes and calls
for including violence and threats of violence committed to
subordinate, marginalize, intimidate or humiliate the victim based
on their identity with a disfavored class.
By recognizing the full scope of gender and emphasizing dis-
crimination as an impermissible purpose, the General Comment
makes clear that violence directed at any person based on actual
perceived sexual or gender identity, or that affects that group dis-
proportionately,96 can be torture.  Sexualized violence and harass-
ment constitute gender violence, as they assault sexual autonomy
and gender identity—concepts at the heart of gender—whether
whether the targeted person is situated as hetero-normative or
transgressive.
For example, in the torture of men in Abu Ghraib, gender as
well as cultural identity was utilized as a means of discrimination to
humiliate and intimidate and theoretically interrogate male prison-
ers in the process. The humiliation had multiple gendered mean-
ings. The sexualized treatment of the men was designed to evoke
homophobic shame of being feminized at the same time as it in-
scribed the idea of hyper-masculine identity identified with domi-
nance, control, and the power to inflict or be free of sexualized
abuse.  Women were used to represent dominance and control to
further drive home the message of emasculation.  These methods
were intentionally linked with assumptions about the particular
cultural impact of these practices on Arab men and thus repre-
91 See General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 20.
92 See id. ¶ 21.
93 Id.
94 Id. ¶ 22.
95 Id. ¶ 20.
96 See General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 22.
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sented discrimination based on religion, ethnicity, and gender.97
The rape of women is gendered in that it is based on notions
of women as male property and, paralleling the Abu Ghraib situa-
tion, a particularly effective assault on women’s identity and sexual-
ity.  Domestic violence against women is gendered because it is
disproportionately based on a person’s status as a woman.  Addi-
tionally, domestic violence is generally fed by discriminatory
gendered assumptions about male entitlement and female obedi-
ence as well as by real or imagined female transgression thereof.98
Obviously transgressive sexual orientation and transgender identity
also belong squarely in this framework.
Where an official is the aggressor, the impermissible purpose
is directly attributable to the State.  The question then is whose
purpose is dispositive where a private person is the aggressor.  In
the context of domestic violence, there is no question that all of
the impermissible purposes are likely to apply to the batterer’s con-
duct. The battered woman or partner is usually isolated; jealousy
reigns and the smallest error or independent action is cause for
violence.  Thus the domestic interrogation: “What did you do?”
“Where were you when I called?” “Why is this dirt on the floor?”
etc.  As with torture, it is not the information but the submission of
the victim that is usually the purpose.  Battering may be inflicted as
punishment often for petty or imagined “infractions” or “disobedi-
ence”— for example, “the coffee is cold”; “you’re ugly”; “you’re
been screwing the neighbor.” Coercion, intimidation and humilia-
tion—tools of subordination—are the persistent purposes of both
torture and battering.  And by definition, gender-based violence is
discriminatory at the same time it may be racially or ethnically mo-
tivated or based on age, disability, poverty, economic dependence
or greater resources or status.
While one noted torture expert is of the view that the purpose
must be the State’s, the current Rapporteur on Torture states that
“the purpose element is always fulfilled if the acts can be shown to
be gender-specific.”99  In my view, the latter’s view is more consis-
97 See, e.g., Jasbir K. Puar, Abu Ghraib: Arguing Against Exceptionalism, 30.2 FEMINIST
STUDIES 522–342004; Rosalind P. Petchesky, Rights of the Body and Perversions of War:
Sexual Rights and Wrongs Ten Years Past Beijing, 57 INT’L SOC. SCI. J., 184, 301 (2005);
ERIC SAAR & VIVECA NOVAK, INSIDE THE WIRE: A MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SOLDIER’S EYE-
WITNESS ACCOUNT OF LIFE AT GUANTANAMO 191 (2005).
98 Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious, supra note 14 (elaborating that gender-based
violence should be recognized as an international human rights violation).
99 Conversation of author with former U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Sir Nigel Rodley
(Apr. 2, 2009).  By contrast the current Torture Rapporteur, Mr. Nowak, writes: “In
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tent with the framework and goals of the Convention and the lat-
ter’s would deny the application of torture to most State-tolerated
private violence. The purposes element in Article 1(1) is tied not to
the State actor but to the infliction of severe pain or suffering.100
The argument would be more plausible if State involvement in the
form of consent or acquiescence were not included.  As discussed
later, the General Comment makes clear that acquiescence is ac-
tual or constructive notice of the danger and the failure to exercise
due diligence to prevent the violence, punish the perpetrators and
repair the victims. Consent too may be inferred from non-action.
Neither Article 1(1) nor the General Comment suggests that the
consenting or acquiescing public official must share the purpose of
the perpetrator.  Accordingly, it is fair to say that where the State
consents to or acquiesces in private conduct, it acquires responsi-
bility for the purposes of the batterer. This is perhaps most clearly
illustrated in relation to the purpose of discrimination. If a State
party stands by or fails to take reasonable and necessary measures
in the face of gender violence, the inevitable effect is impunity and
thereby the perpetuation of the discriminatory violence.
The General Comment clarifies that where the State fails to
exercise due diligence, it “bears responsibility and its officials
should be considered as authors, complicit or otherwise responsi-
ble under the Convention for consenting to or acquiescing in such
impermissible acts.”101 In other words, if an official is to be held
criminally liable through facilitation, aiding and abetting or other-
wise, he or she needs to have the purpose to further the batterer’s
criminal activity or knowledge of the batterer’s intention to do the
violence.102  The issue of State responsibility for violation of the
human right to be free from torture does not require criminal
complicity.  The General Comment explains: “Since the failure of
the State to exercise due diligence to intervene to stop, sanction
and provide remedies to victims of torture facilitates and enables
non-State actors to commit acts impermissible under the Conven-
tion with impunity, the State’s indifference or inaction provides a
form of encouragement and/or de facto permission.”103 In such a
regard to violence against women, the purpose element is always fulfilled if the acts
can be shown to be gender-specific”—i.e. “. . . in its form or purpose . . . [the vio-
lence] is aimed at ‘correcting’ behaviour perceived as non-consonant with gender
roles and stereotypes or at asserting or perpetuating male domination over women.”
Nowak, Strengthening the Protection of Women from Torture, supra note 52, ¶ 30 and n.7.
100 CAT Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(1).
101 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 18.
102 Compare Rome Statute, supra note 48, art. 25.
103 See General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 18.
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situation, it is fully appropriate to ascribe to the State the purposes
of the batterer since the State, through impunity, is in fact advanc-
ing them.
4. State Involvement
a. Official Acts and Actors
It is a given that States parties are responsible for torture com-
mitted, instigated or permitted by their officials.104  The Conven-
tion refers not only to officials, but to others “acting in official
capacity,” and wisely so, for otherwise States could nullify their re-
sponsibility to prevent torture by devolving power and institutional
control to others whether de jure or de facto.105  The General Com-
ment addresses this problem by identifying persons “acting in an
official capacity” as those who are “acting on behalf of the State, in
conjunction with the State, under its direction or control or other-
wise under colour of law.”106  The Committee interprets “colour of
law” to apply to privately owned or run facilities where “personnel
are acting in an official capacity on account of their responsibility
for carrying out the State function.”107  This responsibility applies
to all contexts of custody or control, including not only prisons,
but hospitals, schools, institutions that care for children, the aged,
mentally ill or disabled, or in military service.108  This expansion of
the monitoring responsibility of the Committee is sorely needed
given the often-appalling treatment and conditions in these institu-
tions and the trend toward privatization of prisons or security
forces that could otherwise enable officials to evade their human
rights obligations.  In all these contexts, women and/or girls are at
risk.109
b. Private Actors
The General Comment also grapples quite effectively with the
104 CAT Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(1).
105 Id. art. 1.
106 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 15.
107 Id. ¶ 17.
108 Id. ¶ 15.
109 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HATRED IN THE HALLWAYS, (2001), available at
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2001/uslgbt/toc.htm; SILVIA RIVERA LAW PRO-
JECT, IT’S WAR IN HERE: A REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX
PEOPLE IN NYS MEN’S PRISONS (2007); NAT’L ECON. & SOC. RIGHTS INITIATIVE, DE-
PRIVED OF DIGNITY (2007); Catherine Hawes, Elder Abuse in Residential Long-Term Care
Facilities: What Is Known About Prevalence, Causes, and Prevention, Testimony Before the
U.S. Senate Committee on Finance (June 18, 2002), available at http://finance.
senate.gov/hearings/testimony/061802chtest.pdf.
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public–private distinction, recognizing that States have both nega-
tive and affirmative obligations to prevent torture and ill-treat-
ment.110  The CAT Convention explicitly extended official
responsibility, limited to State infliction or instigation in the 1975
General Assembly’s declaration on torture and other ill-treat-
ment,111 by adding the words “consent or acquiescence” to the def-
inition of torture in Article 1 of the Convention.  This represented
a compromise between those who wanted to include purely private
torture and those who felt that the State has to be the responsible
party.  Consent or acquiescence is not a strict liability standard but
implies a level of awareness.  It was added to ensure that officials
could not escape responsibility by claiming ignorance of violations
not committed by public officials, but for which such officials
should bear some responsibility.112  Several years later, as discussed
earlier, the decision of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights
in the Case of Velásquez Rodrı́guez crystallized this in applying the
obligation of due diligence to non-State violence based on the obli-
gation to “ensure” civil and political rights found in both the Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights and the ICCPR.113
The General Comment makes a significant contribution by
clarifying the meaning of “consent or acquiescence in Article
1(1).”114  It makes clear that it is sufficient if officials or others act-
ing in official capacity “know or have reasonable grounds to believe
that acts of torture are being committed” by private persons.115 Pre-
sumably, the Committee would include threatened acts of torture
as well since prevention is the paramount duty and threats are in-
cluded in the definition of torture.  The General Comment also
links the concept of consent or acquiescence to that of “due dili-
gence” applied in other Conventions and documents.116  Due dili-
110 See generally General Comment No. 2, supra note 2.
111 U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2, G.A.
Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34 at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
112 BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 74, at 41-46.
113 See Velásquez Rodrı́guez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., supra note 36.
114 See General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 18.
115 Id.
116 E.g., CEDAW General Recommendation 19, supra note 43, ¶ 9; U.N. Human
Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obliga-
tion Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add.13 (2004); U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Com-
ment No. 16, The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2005/4 (2005).  For more infor-
mation on the development of this theme in the context of gender violations see the
report by the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women.  U.N. ECOSOC,
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gence, according to the Comment, requires that the State
intervene and prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish non-State
officials and private actors.117 Prevention is an overarching obliga-
tion that is not confined to the specifics of the Convention.118 It
requires full implementation of the positive obligations specifically
demanded by the Convention119 as well as those measures that
have emerged as important in the experience of the Committee.120
Due diligence also includes, but is not limited to, “remedies to vic-
tims.”121 Article 14 of the Convention speaks of “redress,” including
“an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation” for vic-
tims or their survivors and “the means for as full rehabilitation as
possible.”122 Thus “remedies to victims” or “redress” should be un-
derstood as an equitable response, shaped by the situation and the
victims’ needs and thus fairly encompasses the internationally
evolved understanding of reparations.123
Regarding another aspect of consent or acquiescence ad-
dressed by the Convention,124 the General Comment addresses Ar-
ticle 3’s prohibition on State participation in transferring a person
to the custody or control of a person or institution known to have
Comm’n on Human Rights, Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender
Perspective: Violence Against Women: The Due Diligence Standard As a Tool for the Elimination
of Violence Against Women, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61 (Jan. 20, 2006) (prepared by
Yakin Ertürk).
117 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 18.
118 CAT Convention, supra note 4, art. 2; see, e.g., General Comment No. 2, supra
note 2, ¶¶ 1–4.
119 See CAT Convention, supra note 4, arts. 10–16; see generally General Comment
No. 2, supra note 2.
120 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶¶ 14, 24, 25.
121 Id. ¶ 18.
122 CAT Convention, supra note 4, art. 14.
123 See, e.g., ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, The Administration of Justice and
the Rights of Detainees: Revised Set of Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Repara-
tion for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17 (May 24, 1996) (prepared by Theo van Boven); ECOSOC,
Comm’n on Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights Including the Question of Indepen-
dence of the Judiciary, Administration of Justice, Impunity: The Right to Restitution, Compensa-
tion and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62 (Jan. 18, 2000) (prepared by M. Cherif Bas-
siouni).  Of particular relevance are the recent analyses of reparations from a gender
perspective. See, e.g., Nairobi Declaration on Women’s and Girls Right to a remedy
and Reparation, Mar. 19–21, 2007 (the product of a meeting of survivors and advo-
cates, sponsored by the Coalition on Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations),
available at http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/reparation/signature_en.
php; INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, WHAT HAPPENED TO THE WOMEN? GENDER
AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (Ruth Rubio-Mario ed., 2006).
124 CAT Convention, supra note 4, arts. 2, 3.
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engaged in torture or ill treatment without adequate safeguards.125
While this applies clearly to the policies of rendition utilized by the
United States and others in an attempt to facilitate torture of so-
called terrorists without responsibility,126 it also applies to the right
of non-refoulement in situations of gender violence. For example,
it should preclude a justice system from returning battered women
to dangerous homes or communities or to contexts, where, for ex-
ample, women may be subjected to forced marriage127 or rape vic-
tims, required to marry the perpetrator.128
Further related to the element of State responsibility for con-
duct committed by other than State officials is the General Com-
ment’s clarification of the territorial scope of the Convention.129
The obligation to prevent torture applies to all persons subject to
the factual control of the State, including all persons exercising de
facto or de jure authority “in the name of, in conjunction with or at
the behest of the State party.”130 This applies to the major problem
of gender violence committed on or near military bases, in off-
shore prisons, or “during military occupation or peacekeeping op-
erations.”131  In terms of extra-territorial application, it is further
noted that the Convention obliges a State party to extradite or
prosecute foreign nationals, when a perpetrator, both official and
private, is found within the territorial reach of a State.132
In sum, General Comment No. 2 provides important guidance
as to the application of the Convention to gender violence,
125 See General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 19.
126 See Satterwaithe, supra note 3.
127 See Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing In re Alima
Traore, No. A72 169 850 (B.I.A. Apr. 14, 2008)).
128 U.S. federal law, for example, is not consistent with the international standards
and thus does not clearly guarantee the right of non-refoulement to women seeking
to escape private gender violence. Withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3)B) of the
Act and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (c)
(2002). Cases denying relief based upon insufficient state involvement include
Moshud v. Blackman, 68 Fed.Appx. 328, 335 (3d Cir. 2003) (requiring “willful accept-
ance by the State”); Matter of J-E, 23 I & N Dec. 291, 297 (B.I.A. 2002) (requiring,
that the victim be in the official custody or control) and Toure v. Ashcroft, 400 F.3d 44,
50 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that the applicant would not be tortured by a government
official or agent and ignoring that despite criminal prohibition there had been no
prosecution).  Cases granting relief despite limiting federal regulations include Aza-
nor v. Ashcroft, 364 F. 3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003); Matter of D K, B.I.A. (# redacted)
(Elizabeth, NJ, Immigration Court, Aug. 1, 2000). See Nowak, Strengthening the Protec-
tion of Women from Torture, supra note 52.
129 See General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶¶ 7, 16. See also, Walter Kälin, Extra-
territorial Applicability of the Convention Against Torture, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 293 (2008).
130 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 18.
131 Id. ¶ 16.
132 CAT Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(2).
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strengthening the foundation for treating such violence as torture
and where less severe or lacking in impermissible purpose (un-
likely in cases of gender violence) as cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.  It also clarifies the State’s responsibility
for gendered torture inflicted by non-officials and private actors
and thus closes a potentially huge and discriminatory gap in the
monitoring and implementation of the CAT Convention.
C. Gendered Measures of Prevention
While the proper definition of torture and State responsibility
therefore is itself a fundamental measure of prevention, the Gen-
eral Comment also addresses specific measures of prevention, cer-
tain of which are particularly significant to the prevention of
gender violence.
1. Codifying Torture As Torture
The General Comment insists that States use, as a minimum,
the Convention’s definition.133 The General Comment’s call to
States to codify and prosecute violence that meets the elements of
torture as “torture” is important not only to the individual victim,
the perpetrator, the State and the Committee in their ability to
monitor torture; it is also important to the public’s ability to under-
stand when torture occurs and to be able challenge it as such.134 As
we have seen with respect to the “word games” and minor charges
lodged by the Bush administration against a handful of low-level
perpetrators of torture and ill-treatment at Abu Ghraib prison, the
seriousness of the violence in the eyes of the public, as well as the
appropriate punishment, is affected by referring to torture euphe-
mistically as abuse or harsh treatment.
Naming violence and abuse as torture, where it meets the ele-
ments of torture, is especially important when it concerns gender
violence. This applies to the gendered aspect of torture in Abu
Ghraib, as well as to gender violence generally, whether committed
by officials or private persons.  Naming violence that has been tra-
ditionally trivialized or denied as torture is especially significant to
enabling victims of gender violence to shift the responsibility to the
perpetrator and confront the traditional shame that may silence
raped or battered women and sexual minorities.  Naming violence
as torture also serves to heighten public consciousness of the grav-
ity of this violence as well as the urgency of preventive and reme-
133 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 9.
134 Id. ¶ 11.
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dial responses. As a legal matter, it makes it difficult to obscure
violations of the CAT Convention as well as the ICCPR and interna-
tional customary law and it clarifies the status of such violence as
an ius cogens norm. This is not to diminish the significance of the
fact that gender violence, falling short of the elements of torture,
also qualifies as ill-treatment that is likewise a grave and non-dero-
gable violation of the Convention and customary international law.
Nonetheless, the Convention makes a distinction and it should ap-
ply across the board.  It is no longer legitimate, as previously dis-
cussed, to argue that State inflicted violence is inherently worse
than privately inflicted violence and it perpetuates historic gender
discrimination to do so.
Consistent with Convention Article 1(2), the General Com-
ment provides that “[the definition of torture] has to be consid-
ered without prejudice to any higher degree of protection
contained in any international instrument or national law” and
that States are free to adopt broader definitions of torture.135
Whereas, from the perspective of human rights law, some form of
State involvement is required, there is no reason to domestically
limit the prosecution of those who inflict violence essentially meet-
ing the first three elements of torture to one requiring State action.
Nor need a State require both severity of harm and purpose. The
broader approach, reserved to States, allows a purely private viola-
tor to be charged with torture under domestic law.  The naming of
the offense then turns on and reflects the particular seriousness of
the violent crime.  Although this point will be questioned by those
who believe that the State element is constitutive of the norm of
torture rather than a required element of human rights treaties,
such a domestic definition moves toward a more effective applica-
tion of the norm against torture—akin to the international treat-
ment of slavery, which does not depend on State action or
omission.  To eliminate the State element is also fully consistent
with the principle of non-derogability.
2. No Amnesties
Impunity for private gender violence does not usually come in
the shape of formal amnesty for recognized crimes, but rather in
the common failure of legislation to prohibit such violence, or,
more commonly today, the failure of police and justice systems to
investigate, prosecute, and punish such violence.  This is particu-
larly true of  sexualized and domestic violence as well as attacks on
135 Id. ¶ 27.
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sexual and gender transgressors. The General Comment recog-
nizes this in linking the failure to exercise due diligence to
impunity.”136
The question of prosecution and punishment of gender vio-
lence as torture, however, presents a conundrum when applied
particularly to intimate violence.  In some cases, such measures—
considered fundamental by the Convention137—may be insuffi-
cient and even counter-productive to the goal of preventing
gendered torture.  When, for example, battered women view the
criminal justice system as unfair because it is infested by race, class
and gender discrimination, or by garden-variety corruption and
cronyism, they may be loathe to invoke the process.  Women may
be opposed to subjecting a partner, even a violent one, to a racist
system, or, they may have no choice but to make a trade-off be-
tween violence and a source of economic support for the family.138
Further, the danger of retaliation from the batterer for using the
legal system, if access to justice exists, may loom too large. Whereas
middle class and majority women may have recourse to alternatives
to police intervention, poor and minoritized women may fear that
involving the police will result in their own arrest or seizure of their
children or increased surveillance and abuse in their communities.
The prospect of harassing cross-examination and other discrimina-
tory inquiries deter women from pressing charges in rape and
other gender violence cases.
In such contexts, criminal punishment operates neither as an
effective punishment nor possible deterrent.  Thus, in considering
whether there is impunity for gender violence, it is necessary to
examine the degree to which legal, material, racial, gender, class
and cultural barriers that may impede access to justice by women
subjected to gender violence have been addressed.  Beyond that, it
is necessary to examine whether punishment in the form of incar-
ceration is the most appropriate response.139 In other words, the
fact that a victim may avoid utilizing the legal system in response to
136 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 18.
137 See CAT Convention, supra note 4, art. 4.
138 Brenda V. Smith, Battering, Forgiveness, and Redemption, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 921, 932–33?(2003). See Sarah M. Buel & Lisa Davis, CERD Shadow Report,
Domestic Violence and Law Enforcement (Oct. 24, 2007) The report is a response to
the periodic State report of the United States to the United Nations Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
139 See Andrea J. Ritchie, Law Enforcement Violence Against Women of Color, in COLOR
OF VIOLENCE: THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY 156 (Incite! Women of Color Against Violence,
ed., 2006). See generally DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE MARGINS: READINGS ON RACE,
CLASS, GENDER, AND CULTURE (Natalie J. Sokoloff & Christina Pratt eds., 2005); Jenny
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severe gender violence may stem not from the lesser gravity of the
violence, but from the conditions of discrimination, isolation and
vulnerability under which she labors.  Thus, while criminalization
and punishment are a fundamental societal expression of the
norm against gender violence, they are not sufficient and care
must be taken in this context that they not be applied in such a way
as to undermine prevention and protection.
3. Positive Measures to Prevent Gender Violence and
Abuse
The General Comment underscores the positive responsibili-
ties of States parties to protect such persons who are “especially at
risk of torture.”140  It calls for positive measures of prevention and
protection, signaling the Committee’s concern that laws against
torture and ill-treatment are not evenhandedly and effectively en-
forced where marginalized populations and individuals are at
issue.141
4. Training and Employment
The General Comment calls for gender training of staff with
the goal of building gender and other institutional competence in
dealing with marginalized, at risk populations.142 It also calls for
eliminating employment discrimination and promoting the hiring
of persons from minoritized backgrounds and communities in all
facets of State systems, including educational, medical, and legal,
which serve or exercise custody over these populations.143  Having
a diverse workforce reflective of the population at issue will en-
hance the possibility of empathy between those in control and
those controlled and, thus, of “building a culture of respect”
thereby contributing to the prevention of torture.144 While identifi-
cation does not always equate with empathy and institutional prac-
tice can override it, the goal is identify those who will bring cultural
Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National
Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231 (1994).
140 See General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 21.
141 Id. ¶ 21.
142 “Gender competence” is a term coined by Patricia Viseur-Sellers, former Gen-
der Legal Advisor to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in an ef-
fort to get away from the notion that effective response to gender issues and person at
risk is simply a matter of sensitivity, as opposed to one of awareness, empathy, train-
ing, and practice.
143 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 24.
144 See Ervin Staub, The Psychology and Culture of Torture and Torturers, in PSYCHOLOGY
AND TORTURE, 49, 72 (Peter Suedfeld ed., 1990).
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knowledge and sensitivity to the process and thus contribute in for-
mal and informal ways to minimizing harassment and violence. As
to women, there is not only the need to have women to protect the
privacy interests of those under their control; the literature further
indicates that women police, for example, tend to be more effec-
tive at negotiating conflicts as opposed to resorting to violence.145
5. Protection for Female Detainees
Because the Convention requires positive measures to prevent
torture, the General Comment recognizes the need for gender-spe-
cific measures to protect those deprived of liberty and notes, as an
example, the importance of same-sex guards in prisons when pri-
vacy is involved.146  Having female police to protect arrested wo-
men’s privacy is a parallel need.  At the same time, strict
monitoring of and sanctions for sexual harassment and rape of wo-
men (including vaginal searches) subject to police control, in or
outside of jails—particularly sex workers and transgender people—
falls within this concern. The unique reproductive characteristics
of women also call for protective measures to avoid torture and ill-
treatment.  These include, for example, provision of sanitary
materials to menstruating women,147 humane treatment of preg-
nant women, and preventing the practice of shackling women giv-
ing birth.148
6. Monitoring of private violence
This concern, which is the subject of major international doc-
uments,149 is addressed in a single line,150 indicating the limitation
of a mainstreaming gender.  Nonetheless, it is critical to the effec-
tive application of the Convention to preventing private violence.
It embraces reporting on laws and other programs designed to pre-
vent private violence whether in the community or in intimate set-
tings. Since the fact of law does not necessarily affect reality
without enforcement, the General Comments seeks reporting on
145 See Mangai Natarajan, Women Police Stations As a Dispute Processing System: The
Tamil Nadu Experience in Dealing with Dowry-Related Domestic Violence Cases, 16 WOMEN &
CRIM. JUST. 87 (2005).
146 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 14.
147 Castro-Castro, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., supra note 30.
148 U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations of the Committee Against Tor-
ture, United States of America, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (2006).
149 See, e.g., Sec’y Gen, In-Depth Study, supra note 1.
150 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 25.
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the incidence of and responses to private gender violence as a
baseline.
7. Disaggregation of Information
The General Comment notes the “frequent[ ] lack of specific
and sufficient information on the implementation of the Conven-
tion with respect to women.”151  It calls upon States parties to disag-
gregate statistics based on key factors including race, age, and
gender, which should include not only women but also other gen-
der transgressor where identification is possible and is not a
method of harassment.152  This is necessary to ensure effective
monitoring by both State and the Committee153 and should apply
not only to reports on incidents of custodial violence but also to
private and community-based violence, as well as to employment
and other areas of potential discrimination.
7. Public Education
Though public education, as opposed to training of officials, is
not mentioned in the Convention, the General Comment wisely
includes it as an important preventive measure.154  The insistence
on public education is linked to the goal of having a constituency
that is educated about and sensitive to incidents of torture commit-
ted by those who abuse the public trust.155  This is particularly im-
portant in relation to gender violence given that, until recently,
gender violence has been so widely tolerated and culturally ac-
cepted and, in many contexts, it still is.  The Committee specifically
recognizes that educational initiatives, in schools and in communi-
ties, are critical to changing attitudes and conduct that support
and perpetuate this violence.156  This is consistent with all the key
documents that address the prevention of violence against women
generally.157
151 Id. ¶ 22.
152 Id. ¶ 23. For further elaboration see section II(A.) “A.  The Scope of Gender,”
supra text accompanying notes 58-103
153 General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 23.
154 Id. ¶¶ 14, 25.
155 Id. ¶ 25.
156 See id.
157 See, e.g., CEDAW, General Recommendation 19, supra note 38, ¶¶24(f) and
(r)(ii); G.A. Decl. Violence Against Women, supra note 40, arts. 4(j) and (o); Sec’y
Gen, In-depth Study, supra note 1, ¶¶336-354; Organization of American States, Inter-
American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence
against Women (“Convention of Belem do Para”) arts. 7(e), 8, June 9, 1994 33 I.L.M.
1534, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b38b1c.html.
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CONCLUSION
Though limited in detail, the General Comment combines
both an important theoretical as well as practical approach to mon-
itoring the broad range of gender violence that should be treated
within the framework of the Convention, whether as torture or ill-
treatment. It also emphasizes that the naming of violence, and thus
gender violence, as torture is required in many situations.  This has
important legal implications: it supports the ius cogens nature of
gender violence; it underlines the human rights of women and
gender transgressors to reliable protection whether it be in rela-
tion to official or private violence; and it underscores the urgency
of and priority that must be given to the project of  prevention.
Understanding gender violence as torture has heuristic, cul-
tural and personal value.  In the years since the publication of my
1994 article, many women who have survived domestic violence as
well as battered women’s advocates have reported to me that un-
derstanding the experience of battering as torture was revelatory
and empowering in that it shifted the burden of responsibility and
shame to the perpetrator and enabled them to understand their
victimization within the framework of human rights.  I am grateful
therefore to the women in Latin America who inspired this work
and hopeful that the CAT Committee’s monitoring of gender vio-
lence will contribute, on a global to local level, to the process of
empowering the victims, marginalizing the perpetrators, eliminat-
ing the practice altogether, and enabling women to enjoy full
equality in rights.
The parallels between domestic battering and torture under-
score further the point that patriarchal violence and dominion in
the home is a powerful matrix for violence, fear, militarism and the
acceptance of domination as domestic and foreign policy.  As Vir-
ginia Woolf wrote in l938, “[T]he public and private worlds are
inseparably connected . . . the tyrannies and servilities of the one
are the tyrannies and servilities of the other.”158
158 VIRGINIA WOOLF, THREE GUINEAS 142 (Harcourt Mifflin Harcourt 1966)(1938).

